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Abstract 
 
The Barnett formula is the official basis upon which increments to public funds are allocated to 
the devolved regions of the UK for those parts of the budget that are administered locally. 
There is considerable controversy surrounding the implications of its strict application for the 
relevant regions. The existing literature focuses primarily on the equity of the spatial changes to 
government per capita expenditure that would accompany such a change. In contrast, this 
paper attempts to quantify the system-wide economic consequences – the real, relative resource 
squeeze that accompanies the financial relative squeeze – on one devolved region, Scotland. 
The analysis uses a multi-sectoral regional computable general equilibrium modelling approach. 
We highlight the importance of population endogeneity, particularly since the population 
proportions used in the formula are now regularly up-dated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Barnett formula is the official basis upon which increments to public funds are allocated to 
the countries of the UK - Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales - for those parts of the budget 
that are administered locally. In the past, actual allocations have differed markedly from the 
Barnett benchmarks.  However, recent moves towards devolution, and the way that Barnett 
features in the funding of devolved expenditures, have significantly increased the level of interest 
in the formula. There is considerable controversy surrounding the implications for the relevant 
regions of the UK. 
  
The existing literature improves our understanding of the Barnett formula but is extremely 
circumscribed. It focuses primarily on the equity of the spatial changes to government per 
capita expenditure that would accompany the strict imposition of the formula under various 
scenarios. The system-wide economic consequences of its strict imposition have been 
neglected, despite the fact that the Barnett formula drives the regional distribution of an 
important element of aggregate demand. The present paper attempts to fill this gap and in 
particular to focus on the effects of population endogeneity, especially in the presence of the 
regular up-dating of the population weights that was introduced in 1997. We use a multi-
sectoral regional computable general equilibrium model to quantify the relative, real resource 
Barnett squeeze on the Scottish economy.  
  
Section 2 presents an account of how the Barnett formula allocates the devolved budgets and 
the way in which the operation of the formula has changed over time. Section 3 defines the 
notion of a Barnett equilibrium as a distribution of public expenditure which, if reached, would 
be subsequently replicated through the action of the formula. In Section 4 we outline the 
Scottish Computable General Equilibrium model, AMOS, which is used to simulate Barnett 
equilibria under various assumptions concerning the specific administration of the formula and 
the flexibility of the regional economy. Section 5 reports and explains the simulation results, 
which allow us to identify the macroeconomic consequences for the Scottish economy of 
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Barnett being adhered to until per capita government expenditure is equalized with England. 
Section 6 is a short conclusion.  
 
2. Devolved Budgets under Barnett  
 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to know that any increase (or decrease) to the assigned budgets 
of the devolved authorities should be determined by the Barnett formula. The assigned budget 
covers spending under headings such as Health, Social Work, and Education in the devolved 
authorities.1 In 1999, the base year in this study, 77% of the government final demand identified 
in the Scottish input-output accounts is funded from the assigned budget. The remainder consists 
of final demands attributable to programmes reserved to the UK government or financed by 
local authority expenditures.  
 
The Barnett formula allocates a population-based share of any change in comparable English 
DEL expenditure to the devolved authorities of the UK: it does not operate on the base. The 
formula implies that marginal changes in expenditures covered by the assigned budget in 
Scotland are determined by the difference equation: 
 
  G GS t t E t, ,    (1) 
 
where: G is the nominal level of expenditures covered by the assigned budget, the subscripts E, 
S and t stand for England, Scotland and time period respectively,   is the first difference 
operator and   is a parameter based upon the ratio of Scottish to English population. However, 
the population weights used in the formula, that is the population numbers that determine the 
value of the parameter  t in equation (1), have changed over time.   
                                                 
1
 The Assigned Budget covers most of the activities of the devolved administrations, and is the part of 
Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) that is formula-driven. Neither the balance of DEL nor Annually 
Managed Expenditure (AME), the other components of the total funding available to the devolved 
administrations, are formula-driven.  More detail on the different public spending aggregates that apply to 
the devolved authorities is given in H M Treasury (2004) and Ferguson et al (2003).  
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The Barnett formula was used for the first time in 1978 in Scotland and two years later for 
Northern Ireland and Wales, and has been in continuous use ever since.2  The population 
proportions used at the time of the formula's initial implementation were estimates for 1976. 
Under the Barnett formula Scotland then received 10/85ths of any increase or decrease in 
comparable English programmes (HM Treasury, 2004).     
 
There have been a number of subsequent changes to the Barnett allocation mechanism. First, up 
until 1985 the formula was applied in real terms with figures rolling forward from one year to 
another with an in-built allowance for inflation. However, post-1985 expenditure changes have 
been allocated in nominal terms only (HM Treasury, 2004).  Second, in 1992, Michael Portillo, 
as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, revised the formula to reflect the population figures given in 
the 1991 Census, thereby reducing the value of  t in equation (1) from 11.76% to 10.66% 
(McCrone, 1999). Finally in 1997 a rather more fundamental modification was introduced. 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Alastair Darling, committed the government to regular revision 
of the Barnett population weights at each Spending Review, based on the latest population 
estimates for England, Scotland and Wales, published by National Statistics (HM Treasury, 
1997). This adjustment, which we henceforth refer to as the “Darling amendment”, was to take 
effect from 1999.3  
 
A factor central to the debate concerning the operation of the Barnett formula in Scotland is that 
at present Scotland’s per capita identifiable expenditure is higher than the corresponding 
                                                 
2 The formula was named after the then Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Joel Barnett. The formulaic 
approach to allocating public expenditure between the countries of the UK goes back to Chancellor 
Goschen in 1888 (e.g. Heald and McLeod, 2002b). He introduced a formula to allocate probate duties 
between countries in support of local government expenditure, based on each country's overall 
proportionate contribution to the Exchequer. This formula was also used as a basis for allocating some 
elements of public expenditure (e.g. education grants).  
3
 The population proportions used in the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review related to 1996 mid -year 
population estimates. These reported Scotland’s population as 10.45% of the English value. For the 2004 
review the 2003 mid year population estimate was used (10.20% of the English value). (HM Treasury, 2004, 
p10.) While the original intention was to update population estimates annually (HM Treasury, 2004, Annexe 
A p.38), they are now updated biennially in line with spending reviews. 
 6 
English figure (by 18% in 1999-2000, though this rises to 25% if Social security is excluded,  
Heald and McLeod, 2002a, Table 10.2). Under strict adherence to the Barnett formula, the 
marginal allocation of the assigned budget to Scotland is lower than its average allocation. Much 
of the Scottish literature surrounding the operation of the Barnett formula therefore focuses on 
the fact that with increasing nominal public expenditure in England, the proportionate public 
expenditure advantage at present enjoyed by Scots will decline. This is the so-called Barnett 
squeeze (see, for example, Bell et al 1996; Cuthbert, 2001; Edmonds, 2001; Heald, 1996; 
Heald and McLeod, 2002a; Kay, 1998; McCrone, 1999; McLean and McMillan, 2003, 
Midwinter, 2000, 2002; Twigger 1998.) 
 
It is important to say that during much of the period since 1979, bypass and adjustment of non-
formula-driven expenditures have meant that actual expenditures in Scotland appear to have 
differed, to Scotland’s advantage, from the level implied by the strict application of the Barnett 
formula (Midwinter, 2002). However, the formula has been accepted as the basis for 
determining the assigned budget of the Scottish Parliament (and the budgets of other devolved 
territories), which together with the greater transparency produced by devolution, has led to a 
belief that the Barnett formula will play a more central role in the actual allocation in the future 
(Goudie, 2002).  
 
3. Barnett Equilibria 
 
In this paper we focus on the impact of the operation of the Barnett formula on a single 
devolved territory. We take the case of Scotland, but in principle the analysis can be replicated 
for any other region. Existing work on the Barnett formula attempts to reveal the evolution of 
Scottish per capita expenditure (covered by the assigned budget) under a strict Barnett regime 
and alternative scenarios concerning the exogenous growth in nominal comparable English 
expenditures and exogenous population changes. It is organised around the following 
relationship: 
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where P is population and the other terms are as defined above for equation 1. 
 
This extant analysis has two main weaknesses. First, it is restrictive in that it simply charts the 
public finance implications of the operation of the Barnett allocation formula. We wish to focus 
on the impact of such changes on the real economy: that is, to identify the real, relative macro-
economic squeeze that matches the relative financial squeeze. Second, existing work is also 
conceptually flawed if the changes in devolved public expenditure have direct demographic 
implications. We would expect that adjustments in aggregate economic activity brought about 
by changes in government expenditure would influence migration flows, so that the spatial 
distribution of population becomes endogenous. We incorporate this endogeneity in our 
analysis.   
  
In this paper we model the system-wide impacts on economic activity and population of the 
change in devolved government expenditure that would result if the Barnett formula were to be 
rigorously applied until relevant per capita expenditures in Scotland are equalized with those in 
England. We limit our investigation to the impact on a single region. Further, we adopt the small-
region assumption, so that changes in the region’s activity, fiscal arrangements and population 
do not have impacts on the rest of the nation large enough for there to be perceptible feedback 
to the region itself.  
 
We do not track the period by period changes in economic activity. Our main purpose is to 
explore the scale of the impacts on Scotland if per capita funding were to be equalized with 
England and to identify the factors magnifying/ reducing these effects.  We therefore focus on 
the economic implications of achieving Barnett equilibria. We designate a Barnett equilibrium to 
be a spatial allocation of devolved expenditure (covered by the assigned budget) which, once 
reached, would be replicated by the subsequent operation of the Barnett formula. The impacts 
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of reaching a Barnett equilibrium are identified under a range of assumptions concerning the 
nature of the regional economy and the detailed operation of the Barnett allocation mechanism.4   
 
Where the Barnett population weights, taken at time period 0, are fixed, then the Barnett 
equilibrium is very straightforward to determine. In the two-region case, in time period t the 
Barnett equilibrium ratio of relevant government expenditure in the two regions, BF, where the F 
superscript stands for fixed population weights, is given as5: 
 
 B
G
G
P
P
F S t
E t
S
E
 ,
,
,
,
0
0
 (3) 
 
Our concern is to quantify the impact of the adjustment in government expenditure required to 
achieve the Barnett equilibrium on the level and composition of economic activity in Scotland. In 
order to isolate this impact, we keep all other exogenous Scottish and Rest of the UK (RUK) 
variables fixed. Essentially we impose the ceteris paribus assumption. As noted above, we are 
also operating with a stand-alone regional model that ignores inter-regional feedback effects. 
These combined exogeneity assumptions mean that the analysis simply concentrates on the 
impact of change in public expenditure in Scotland in a straightforward comparative static 
manner. In this case the Barnett equilibrium nominal government expenditure is given by: 
 
                                                 
4
  Barnett equilibria cannot be justified in terms of any public economic theory that we are aware of: there is 
no fundamental theoretical rationale for an equilibrium in which there is equality of per capita government 
expenditures across regions. However, this does not, of course, imply that the equilibria are uninteresting, 
since the stated basis of the funding of the devolved territories implies that the system moves towards such 
equilibria. It is of interest to explore what would happen if Barnett were strictly implemented. 
5
 Further, this equilibrium is stable in the sense that in periods of increasing nominal government 
expenditure, the operation of the Barnett formula will drive the distribution towards the Barnett equilibrium, 
independently of the initial distribution. That is to say: 
G
G
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Whilst the exogeneity assumptions imposed in equation (4) appropriately focus the simulations, 
can they be justified? In particular, we know that nominal government expenditure in England 
(and also Scotland) must rise for a Barnett equilibrium to be reached with existing population 
weights. Will these increases not automatically violate the ceteris paribus assumptions that we 
have imposed? 
 
The approach we adopt can be motivated in two ways. First, equation (4) could be thought of 
as resulting from purely nominal changes in the UK economy, with no changes in real exogenous 
variables aside from Scottish public expenditure. As long as the two economies are 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices, so that real variables are unaffected by equi-
proportionate changes in all prices, this interpretation is valid. A second justification for equation 
(4) is that it shows the proportionate deviations from the counterfactual that would occur in the 
Scottish economy if the Barnett equilibrium were imposed in a UK economy experiencing linear 
expansion. That is, an economy with all real exogenous variables (both Scottish and RUK) 
increasing at the same rate. In this case, provided that the economies are linear homogeneous in 
the real exogenous variables, so that changes in exogenous variables generate equi-
proportionate adjustments in real variables, this is a reasonable interpretation.   
 
Up to now we have been considering the application of the Barnett formula with fixed 
population weights. However, as explained in the previous section, under the 1997 Darling 
amendment, the population weights used to calculate marginal nominal changes in assigned 
budgets are, if required, updated to reflect any changes in the population levels. Under this 
formulation a necessary condition for the economy to be in a Barnett equilibrium in time period t 
would be that:  
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where BV represents the Barnett equilibrium ratio with variable population weights (that is, with 
the full updating of those weights). Equation (5) indicates that in this case, Barnett equilibrium 
implies that covered nominal public expenditure per head will be equalised among devolved 
territories.6  
 
In the single-region analysis, with again all exogenous variables - including English nominal 
government expenditure, prices and population - held constant, equation (5) implies: 
 
 G PS S   (6) 
 
where  
G
P
E
E
. Equation (6) captures the equilibrium operation of the Barnett mechanism in 
the allocation of expenditure. It is shown as the Barnett distribution line BV  in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
But with population endogenous, there will be a second relationship between Scottish 
population and covered nominal expenditure that operates through the requirement for zero net 
migration in Barnett equilibrium. That is to say, for any given Scottish nominal expenditure, there 
will be a corresponding equilibrium population level consistent with the need to generate no 
desire for either net out- or in-migration. This can be expressed as: 
 
 P P GS S S ( )  (7) 
                                                 
6
 In practice, population estimates are up-dated biennially, using the previous year’s population estimate. 
This lagged response would, of course, matter for any period-by-period analysis of the formula, but in this 
paper we concentrate only on equilibria, which are unaffected by the presence of any lags in adjustment 
(given dynamic stability), including those relating to the up-dating of weights. 
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with, again, all other exogenous variables held constant. Expression (7) identifies the equilibrium 
Scottish population level supported by a given level of nominal assigned budget with English 
activity, prices and population fixed and with other elements of Scottish final demand constant at 
their initial values. The specific character of the relationship expressed by equation (7) will 
depend upon the nature of the local economy and this is discussed in more detail in Sections 4 
and 5. However, we expect P
dP
dG
S
S
S
( ),0 0 . Equation (7) is represented as the equilibrium 
population line, Z, in Figure 1. Simultaneously meeting the conditions represented by equations 
(6) and (7) generates the variable-weight Barnett equilibrium population and nominal 
Government expenditures. This is shown in Figure 1 as the intersection, E, between the lines BV 
and Z. 
 
In considering the stability of the variable-weight Barnett equilibrium, Figure 1 suggests that if 
there is one or more equilibria, then at least one will be stable in terms of the equilibrium 
relationships identified here. The Barnett distribution curve, BV must cut the equilibrium 
population curve M from below. If the initial government allocation is above GVS
*, then the 
equilibrium population (read from line Z) is below that required to justify that level of 
expenditure (as indicated by BV). Expenditure falls, but then the subsequent population 
adjustment is insufficient to maintain that nominal government expenditure, until point E is 
reached. Similarly, if the initial population is above PS
*, subsequent changes in the allocation of 
nominal expenditures are not large enough to maintain this population. The variable weight 
Barnett equilibrium is therefore stable, subject to exogenous shocks. Section 4 next outlines the 
economic features of the CGE model we employ, in Section 5, to simulate the impact of Barnett 
equilibria.  
 
4. The AMOS simulation model 
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AMOS is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling framework that is parameterised 
on data from a UK region, Scotland.7 A very brief description is presented in this section: more 
detail is available in the Appendix and a full listing of an earlier vintage of the AMOS model is 
provided in Harrigan et al (1991). The current version of AMOS has 3 transactor groups, 
namely households, corporations, and government;8 25 commodities and activities and two 
exogenous external transactor groups, the Rest of the UK and the Rest of the World (RUK and 
ROW). Throughout this paper commodity markets are taken to be competitive. We do not 
explicitly model financial flows, our assumption being that Scotland is a price-taker in 
competitive UK financial markets and, under the small open economy assumption, the interest-
rate-setting decisions of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee are taken to be 
exogenous to Scotland.  
 
Production is determined through cost minimisation with multi-level production functions. These 
are generally of a CES form but with Leontief and Cobb-Douglas available as special cases. 
For simplicity, in this paper all domestic intermediate transactions are Leontief. Otherwise we 
assume CES technology (notably for the production of value-added from capital and labour 
services) with "best guess" elasticities of substitution of 0.3 (Harris, 1989). 
 
There are four major components of final demand: consumption, investment, exports and 
government expenditure. Of these, consumption varies proportionately with real disposable 
income.  Exports (and imports) are generally determined via an Armington link (Armington, 
1969) and are therefore relative-price sensitive with trade substitution elasticities of 2.0 (Gibson, 
1990). Nominal government expenditure in Scotland is taken to be exogenous and the policy 
shocks involve changes to this variable. Of course when we have full updating of the Barnett 
formula there is a degree of endogeneity in that we link relevant government nominal expenditure 
                                                 
7
  AMOS is an acronym for A Macro-micro model Of Scotland. For a general review of CGE modelling see 
Greenaway et al, (1993) and for a appraisal of regional CGE models consult Partridge and Rickman (1998). 
8
 At present, AMOS treats Scotland as a self-governing economy, in the sense that there is only one 
consolidated government sector.  Central government activity is partitioned to Scotland and combined with 
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to the population level. Investment is initially set equal to depreciation although, as explained 
later in this section, in the short-run capital stock is endogenous.  
 
In Section 5 we report the results of simulations under varying degrees of flexibility for the 
Scottish economy. The labour market is a potentially important source of inflexibility. In all the 
simulations reported in this paper we impose a unified local labour market characterised by 
perfect sectoral mobility. However, we simulate under two separate bargaining functions: 
regional bargaining and national bargaining. Under regional bargaining the regional real 
consumption wage is directly related to workers’ bargaining power, and therefore inversely 
related to the regional unemployment rate (Minford et al, 1994). Even in a regional context, 
there is now widespread empirical support for this “wage curve” formulation (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1994). Here we take the parameters for the regional bargaining function from the 
econometric work reported by Layard et al. (1991): 
 
 w a u ws t s t s t, , ,. .   0 068 040 1  (10) 
  
where ws and us are the natural logarithms of the Scottish real consumption wage and the 
unemployment rate respectively, t is the time subscript and a is a calibrated parameter.9  
 
Under national wage bargaining, a small open region faces a nationally determined wage. 
Essentially this implies that the regional labour market is characterised by an exogenously-
determined fixed nominal wage rate. This characterisation of the labour-market explicitly or 
implicitly characterises much UK theoretical and empirical regional analysis (Arup Economics 
and Planning, 2000; Harris, 1991; Holden and Swales, 1995; Roper and O’Shea, 1991).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
local government activity. This is adequate for the present paper but a more sophisticated treatment of the 
public sector is part of the work plan under the ESRC Devolution project.  
9
 The calibration is made so that the model, together with the set of exogenous variables, will recreate the 
base year data set. This calibrated parameter does not influence simulation outputs, but the assumption of 
initial equilibrium is, of course, important. 
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A second key characteristic that determines the degrees of flexibility exhibited by the regional 
economy concerns population. Population is assumed to be either fixed or to be fully adjusted 
to the relevant changes in economic circumstances. Where population adjustment is allowed, it 
is driven by a relationship linking Scottish net migration positively (negatively) to the real wage 
(unemployment rate) differential with the rest of the UK. This variant of the Harris and Todaro 
(1970) approach is commonly employed in studies of US migration (e.g. Greenwood et al, 
1991; Treyz et al, 1993). It is parameterised here from the econometrically estimated model 
reported in Layard et al. (1991):  
 
 m b u u w ws r s r    008 006. ( ) . ( )  (11) 
 
where: m is the net in-migration rate (as a proportion of the indigenous population); wr and ur 
are the natural logarithms of the RUK real consumption wage and unemployment rates and b is 
a calibrated parameter.10 
 
The Scottish population is initially assumed to be in equilibrium. After an exogenous shock, full 
population adjustment implies a change in the population, with the attendant implications for the 
unemployment rate and the real wage rate, to the point where net migration falls to zero. 
Therefore setting m = 0 in equation (11) generates the following zero-net-migration relationship 
between the wage and unemployment rate:  
 
 w w u u
b
s r s r   133
0 06
. ( )
.
 (12) 
 
A third source of regional flexibility concerns adjustments to the capital stock. Again we assume 
that in the base period the capital stock is optimally adjusted. Under some simulations, the 
aggregate capital stock, and its sectoral composition, is held fixed at the base year values. In 
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others, full capital adjustment is imposed, which implies that in each sector the actual and 
desired capital stock is re-equated, so that the capital rental rate equals the risk-adjusted user 
cost of capital. 
 
If we simultaneously impose the regional bargaining option in the labour market and the 
migration function specified in equation (11), we have a CGE variant of the Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman regional model (Layard et al, 1991). This is our preferred model set up because there 
exists considerable supporting evidence for it. With the model parameterised in this way, 
equations (10) and (12) together determine the real wage and unemployment rate. This implies 
that, with unchanged values for the RUK real wage and unemployment rate, population 
equilibrium will reinstate the Scottish initial real wage and unemployment rate subsequent to any 
exogenous demand or ssupply shock apart from one to the bargaining or migration functions 
themselves (McGregor et al, 1995).  
 
With both regional and national bargaining, imposing full capital and population adjustments in 
the face a demand disturbance produces no change in prices, the real wage or the 
unemployment rate. The economy acts as a population-endogenous input-output system 
(McGregor et al, 1996). Therefore the equilibrium population relationship - identified in the 
previous section and illustrated in Figure 1 - between nominal government expenditure and the 
population level is in this case linear.  
 
5. Simulating Barnett equilibria 
 
In the simulations reported in this paper, we are particularly interested in the neglected issues of 
population endogeneity, especially given the Darling amendment requiring the full updating of the 
population weights. To quantify these effects, we carry out alternative simulations with no 
population change and with full population change and with no and full updating of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 Again, the calibrated parameter is to ensure population equilibrium (zero net migration) in the base year. 
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population weights.  However, we are also concerned with the quantitative impact of regional 
labour and capital market flexibility. We therefore undertake alternative simulations with regional 
and national wage bargaining and with no and full capital adjustment. This means that there are 
four economic and policy characteristics that vary between simulations. For each of these 
characteristics two options are allowed, so that we have a possible 16 (24) sets of simulation 
results.11  
 
However, before reporting these results, Figure 2 extends the analysis used in Section 3 to 
illustrate the impact of population endogeneity in these simulations. Figure 2 is again drawn in 
nominal assigned-budget expenditure, G, and population, P, space. The initial equilibrium – that 
is, before the imposition of the Barnett equilibrium - is at A, with population and expenditure P0, 
G0. 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
There are three equilibrium population curves - ZL, Z
R
M and Z
N
M - that pass through point A. 
These curves represent the long (ZL) and medium-run (Z
R
M and Z
N
M) relationships between 
population and nominal government expenditure imposed via the zero net migration condition. 
The long-run relationship is where the capital stock is allowed to optimally adjust. As noted in 
Section 4, for the AMOS model this relationship will be linear and is invariant to the nature of 
the bargaining function used. In the medium run, capital is held fixed and the equilibrium 
population relationship will depend on the wage setting function imposed in the recipient region. 
We therefore distinguish national and regional bargaining using the appropriate superscripts.  
 
We expect the equilibrium population to be more sensitive to changes in government 
expenditure in the long run than in the medium run. The most straightforward way to think about 
this is to compare the situations under regional bargaining. In both the medium and long run, with 
                                                 
11
 In practice, a number of characteristic combinations produce the same outcome, so that only 10 sets of 
simulation results need to be reported.  
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regional bargaining the real wage and unemployment rate take their base-period values. In both 
these time periods, the proportional population change will therefore equal the corresponding 
proportional employment change. However, in the medium run, the fixed real wage implies a 
reduction in the nominal wage with the cpi falling as a result of lower capital rental rates. On the 
other hand, in the long run the initial nominal wage is reinstated. The improved competitiveness 
of the medium-run Barnett equilibrium produces a lower proportionate reduction in employment 
– and therefore also population - in the medium run than in the long run.  
 
It is difficult to rank, a priori, the sensitivity to government expenditure changes of the two 
medium-run equilibrium population curves. A relative fall in exogenous demand with fixed 
capital stock generates a fall in the cpi as capital rentals fall. Therefore with regional bargaining 
the nominal wage will fall, even though the real consumption wage is unchanged whilst with 
national bargaining the regional nominal wage is unchanged, so that the regional real wage will 
rise. This differential labour market response to the change in expenditure has implications for 
the slope of the corresponding equilibrium population curves. With regional bargaining, the 
imposition of the zero net migration condition reinstates the original unemployment rate and real 
wage (McGregor et al., 1995). But for national bargaining, population equilibrium will require 
the regional unemployment rate to rise, to offset the increased real consumption wage (equation 
12). The increased unemployment rate will mean that for any given level of employment, 
population will be higher with national bargaining than with regional bargaining. However, the 
differential inflexibility in the regional labour market will imply that the medium-run employment 
effects of a reduction in relevant expenditure will be greater under national bargaining than 
regional bargaining. These two effects are operating in the opposite direction, as far as the 
impact on population is concerned. In the parameterisation adopted with the AMOS model, the 
differential competitiveness effect far outweighs the differential unemployment effect. This implies 
that equilibrium population is more sensitive to changes in government expenditure under 
national bargaining than regional bargaining. This is reflected in the way that the relevant curves 
have been drawn in Figure 2.    
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Barnett equilibria with fixed population weights 
 
Imposing the Barnett equilibrium for Scotland implies a reduction in relevant expenditure. Begin 
with the Barnett equilibrium with fixed weights. The new nominal DEL expenditure would be the 
initial Scottish population times the English per capita nominal DEL,  . With fixed population 
weights, this gives a new Scottish nominal expenditure that is independent of subsequent 
changes in population. It is represented in Figure 2 by the vertical line BF.  If population is fixed, 
the equilibrium is at C. Population is at its original value P0 and the nominal expenditure falls to 
GF. The value of other key economic variables will depend upon the degree of flexibility 
exhibited by other elements of the Scottish economy, for example the nature of the labour 
market and the degree of capital fixity.  
 
If full population adjustment is allowed, Figure 2 shows three possibilities, indicated by points D, 
E and F. The most straightforward case is where the capital stock is also allowed to fully adjust. 
The Barnett equilibrium is here at F and represents the input-output adjustment to the reduced 
government expenditure (McGregor et al, 1996). Output in all sectors will fall with a 
corresponding proportionate reduction in employment. Because the zero net migration condition 
implies no change in the unemployment rate, the proportionate fall in population will equal the 
proportionate fall in total employment. If the capital stocks are held fixed, the new equilibrium 
position depends on the imposed bargaining function. Where regional bargaining is adopted the 
equilibrium will be at point D in Figure 2: under national bargaining, the equilibrium is at E. The 
population loss is greater for national bargaining, reflecting the more substantial fall in 
employment with national, as against regional, bargaining.  
 
Barnett equilibria with variable (up-dated) population weights 
 
In Figure 2, at point C the Scottish per capita expenditure equals the initial English figure. If 
there is to be constant updating of the Barnett weights, the equilibria must lie on the straight line 
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from the origin through C. This is simply a representation of equation (6) and the slope of the 
line is 
1

. 
 
If there is no population change, the issue of updating the weights in the Barnett formula simply 
does not arise. However, where the equilibrium population level does adjust to changes in 
nominal expenditure, unless the weights are amended, Barnett equilibrium expenditure per 
capita will continue to vary across the devolved regions. The interaction of endogenous 
population with the updating of the population weights in the Barnett formula leads to the 
appropriate equilibria shifting from D, E and F to G, H and I. Points D, E and F cannot be 
equilibria under variable population weights: indeed in every instance expenditure is higher than 
required for Barnett equilibrium. In each case, therefore, expenditure falls, inducing falls in 
population and further expenditure contraction as a result of the updating. From inspection of 
Figure 2, we expect that the population adjustment will be larger with full capital adjustment than 
where capital stock is fixed. Population is more responsive to changes in expenditure where 
capital stock adjusts, generating larger multiplier effects.  
 
Simulation results 
 
In order to attain greater precision for the population and government expenditure changes and 
to identify the impacts on other key economic variables, we perform an extensive set of 
simulations across different Barnett equilibria. The results for the change in real government 
expenditure, GDP and employment are given in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Each cell containing figures 
gives the result from a Barnett equilibrium simulation with a particular set of characteristics. The 
degree of capital fixity and the bargaining function used determine the row in which the result is 
reported. The population adjustment and the degree of updating of the Barnett population 
weights determine the column. Therefore, for example, the 10.72% reduction in Scottish real 
government expenditure where: the capital stock is fixed and national bargaining is imposed, 
together with full population adjustment in the economy but no updating of the Barnett weights, 
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is found in the 2nd row and 2nd column of Table 1. In each cell in which results are reported, we 
have also shown – in the top right-hand corner - the point on Figure 2 to which the result 
corresponds.  
 
Table 1 gives the proportionate change in real government expenditure in Scotland associated 
with the imposition of the various Barnett equilibria. An 11.26% reduction in Scottish nominal 
expenditure is required to bring per capita 1999 nominal (assigned budget) expenditure in 
Scotland into line with the corresponding English figure for the same year.12 Therefore for 
simulations where the population is fixed or the population weights are not updated, this is the 
appropriate nominal change. This nominal adjustment therefore applies in the simulations 
reported in columns 1 and 2 in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
However, to identify changes in real government expenditure we need also to adjust for changes 
in the Scottish cpi. For the results where the imposition of a Barnett equilibrium generates no 
change in the Scottish cpi, the real and nominal government expenditure changes will be equal at 
–11.26%. For simulations with fixed population, this only applies where there is national 
bargaining and full capital adjustment. For simulations where population is fully adjusted but 
there is no change in the Barnett population weights, cpi is unchanged where capital fully 
adjusts, independent of the nature of the bargaining mechanism. In all the other cases reported in 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 1, the reduction in economic activity generates a fall in the cpi and this 
slightly mitigates the real impact of the nominal reduction in expenditure. In these cases the real 
government expenditure adjustment lies in the range –10.82% and –10.65%.  
 
Where there is full population adjustment and full updating of the Barnett population weights, the 
reduction in real government expenditure is markedly higher. These results are given in column 3 
                                                 
12
 This is expenditure as defined for the Government final demand column in the Scottish input -output 
tables. 
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and range from –12.43% to –14.58%. Comparing the figures in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 
reveals that the largest absolute and proportional additional fall in real government expenditure 
through the imposition of the Darling amendment to the Barnett formula occurs where there is 
also full capital adjustment. This is the shift represented by the movement from F to I in Figure 
2.  
 
In analysing the economic effects of these reductions in real government expenditure, we begin 
with the results from the fixed population simulations. These simulations reflect the belief that 
population would be unaffected by the government demand changes; a view that existing studies 
of Barnett formula impacts usually adopt. In this case there are no population adjustments and 
no requirement for the updating of the population weights in the Barnett formula. 
 
The GDP and employment changes are given in the first column of Tables 2 and 3. (These are 
read in an exactly analogous manner to Table 1, with the degree of capital fixity and wage 
bargaining governing the row and population adjustment and the degree of weight up-dating 
deciding the column.) For both the fixed capital and full capital adjustment cases, the reduction 
in activity is greater with national bargaining than regional bargaining. The reason is quite 
straightforward. With regional bargaining, the nominal wage will fall with the reduction in 
exogenous demand as unemployment rises and the cpi falls. This improves competitiveness 
reduces the negative impact on the Scottish economy. With national bargaining there is no 
downward pressure on wages and the negative effects of the government expenditure changes 
are therefore much greater. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
With a constant population, the impact on activity of allowing full capital adjustment differs 
between the two bargaining models. With national bargaining, a fixed capital stock goes 
someway to cushioning the impact of the reduced government expenditure. Although nominal 
wages are unchanged, capital rentals fall, so that competitiveness improves. Therefore some 
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increase in regional exports partially offsets the fall in real government expenditure. However, 
full capital adjustment leads to capital rentals returning to their base-period levels as 
disinvestment occurs. This produces a model that corresponds to an extended input-output with 
investment and social security payments endogenous (Batey, 1985). The reduction in both 
employment and GDP in this case is large, at 3.30% and 3.61% respectively. 
 
The fixed-population, regional bargaining simulations are very different. In this case, with capital 
fixed, the fall in the nominal wage associated with the Barnett equilibrium underpins an increase 
in output and employment in many trade-orientated sectors, as their price competitiveness 
improves. For these sectors, the capital rental rate actually rises together with the fall in the 
capital rental rates in those sectors dominated by government demand. The impact of allowing 
full adjustment of the capital stock is to stimulate activity in the trade-orientated sectors by more 
than the reduction in activity in the government-dominated sectors. The additional net effect of 
allowing full capital adjustment here is therefore positive on both GDP and employment, which 
now fall by slightly less. With population fixed and regional bargaining, the impact on Scottish 
GDP is in the range –1.22 to –1.27 and employment –1.40 and –1.46.     
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Incorporating the full population adjustment, but no updating of the population weights in the 
Barnett formula, gives the results reported in column 2 of Tables 2 and 3. The range of GDP 
reductions under these circumstances is –1.75% to –3.56%, with the employment reduction 
range being -2.27% to -3.88%. The main impact of imposing the population adjustment is on 
the real wage in the simulations adopting regional bargaining. Under regional bargaining, allowing 
full population adjustment increases the real wage to its original level, and this means reinstating 
the original nominal wage where full capital adjustment is also imposed. These wage adjustments 
for the regional bargaining and full capital adjustment simulation increase the absolute size of the 
GDP reduction from 1.22% to 3.56%. Where there is national bargaining, allowing population 
adjustment has no impact on the nominal wage and the additional effects come primarily through 
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changes in consumption demand, stemming from lower social security payments. It is useful to 
note that where population is endogenous and fully adjusted, for all the regional bargaining and 
all the full capital adjustment simulations, the percentage change in population equals the 
percentage change in employment. For the simulation with capital fixed and national bargaining, 
the population loss (2.64%) is a little less than the reduction in employment (2.70%).  
 
Finally, the results that include the updating of the Barnett formula weights are given in the third 
column of Tables 2 and 3. Comparing these results with the corresponding figures in column 2 
gives the effect that the full updating of the population weights has on the level of Scottish 
activity in Barnett equilibrium. This impact is always to magnify the absolute size of the fall in 
activity. It is relatively small where the capital stock is fixed: the absolute size of the reduction in 
activity is increased by less than 20%. However, where there is full capital stock adjustment the 
simultaneous full updating of the population weights increases the negative impact on 
employment and GDP by almost 30%. Again, for these simulations, the % change in population 
is the same as the % change in employment except where there is national bargaining with a 
fixed capital stock. In that case, population falls by 3.16% as against the employment reduction 
of 3.23%.  
 
Sectoral disaggregation 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present sectorally disaggregated Barnett equilibrium results for the model with 
regional bargaining and, where appropriate, with full updating of the Barnett formula population 
weights. This is our favoured treatment of the labour market because it is based on an 
econometrically estimated wage curve. Results are given for time intervals delineated by the 
degree of capital and population fixity. These are the short, medium and long runs. The short run 
has both population and capital stocks fixed. The medium run has population fully adjusted but 
capital stocks fixed. The long run has full adjustment for both population and capital stocks. 
These simulations therefore correspond to points C, G and I in Figure 2. Figure 3 gives the 
 24 
percentage sectoral GDP (value added) changes and Figure 4 the corresponding employment 
changes 
 
[Figures 3 and 4 near here] 
 
It is clear that the reduction in activity is focused on the two sectors “Public Administration and 
Defence” and “Education, Health and Social Work”. This concentration of effects is not 
surprising since these sectors bear the brunt of the direct reduction in expenditure. However, in 
the short run the majority of the other sectors experience an increase in activity, as falling 
nominal wages and intermediate prices increase competitiveness and generate labour market 
“crowding in”. In the medium run, the full population adjustment, and further fall in government 
expenditure, reduces any initial employment gains, and ten out of the twenty five sectors now 
show employment losses. Once the full capital stock adjustment is also incorporated, activity 
falls in all sectors as the simulations replicate an extended input-output system.  
 
Overall, the results emphasise the critical importance of population adjustment in determining the 
scale of Barnett-induced relative contractions in activity, and the significance of moving to a 
system of variable population proportions. In effect, the Darling amendment to the Barnett 
formula eliminates a significant element of automatic stabilisation from the regional system of the 
UK. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The simulation results point to a potentially sizeable contractionary impact of Barnett equilibria in 
Scotland and the importance of the wage-bargaining, migration and capital adjustment 
processes in governing the likely scale of these effects. Under regional bargaining, if population 
is fixed, the size of the reduction in regional activity in Barnett equilibrium is relatively small. The 
reduction in GDP and employment is less than 1.3% and 1.5% respectively. Moreover, as the 
capital stock adjusts this makes little difference to the change in aggregate activity. However, 
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with endogenous population, even with no updating of the Barnett weights, the negative impact 
on Scottish economic activity is considerably increased. This is particularly true where capital 
adjustment occurs. Finally, if the population weights in the Barnett formula are constantly 
updated, the real reduction in government expenditure, and the corresponding reduction in 
activity, is further intensified. With full capital and population adjustment, the Darling-amended 
Barnett equilibrium implies a 4.61% reduction in Scottish GDP and a 5.03% reduction in 
Scottish employment and population. While certainly substantial, these results may not be large 
relative to other possible disturbances to the Scottish economy, such as the projected decline in 
Scotland’s population of working age, although variable population proportions in the Barnett 
formula will operate to reinforce such disturbances (Lisenkova et al, 2006). 
 
While our analysis represents a significant generalisation of past work, there remain four 
important areas for further research. First, while we concentrate here on the implications of 
Barnett equilibria, we know that these are only attained after a substantial lag, reflecting delays 
in up-dating population weights, the incremental nature of the formula and the typically extended 
nature of migration and capital stock adjustment processes. The adjustment process clearly 
merits further investigation.  
 
Second, our assumption that the expenditure changes analysed here constitute a pure demand 
disturbance considerably simplifies our analysis. It allows us to focus on this critical but 
previously neglected aspect of the formula. However, adverse supply-side impacts may well 
accompany the relative expenditure contractions, so that the estimates we present cannot be 
regarded as providing a “worst case” scenario.  There are at least two relevant aspects to this. 
First, the reduction in real government expenditure might directly reduce productive efficiency 
by limiting policies aimed at improving local development and skills. Second, if the reduction in 
real per capita government expenditure lowers the amenity value associated with living in 
Scotland, this will further encourage out-migration and generate an increase in the real wage so 
as to satisfy the zero net migration requirement. These supply impacts merit further investigation.  
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Third, our analysis explores the impact of Barnett on economic activity in Scotland alone. The 
extensive use of the small-region assumption means that inter-regional spillovers and national 
macro-economic constraints are ignored. We know from the existing distribution of per capita 
government expenditures that adherence to Barnett implies that Wales will be subject to smaller, 
and Northern Ireland greater, contractions in demand than Scotland. The economy of England 
will, however, benefit, but identification of the scale of the impacts necessitates the use of an 
explicitly interregional modelling framework.  
 
A fourth area is the investigation of a wider range of alternative schemes for distributing public 
expenditures among the regions of the UK. A number of authors have argued that the strict 
imposition of the Barnett formula is unsustainable (Christie, 2002; McLean and McMillan, 
2003). At the simplest level, should up-dated “needs assessments” become available, it would, 
of course, be instructive to compare the implied needs equilibria with the corresponding Barnett 
equilibria, but the last publicly available needs assessment relates to 1976-77 (reported in HM 
Treasury, 1979). However, a number of variants of greater fiscal autonomy have been 
proposed and future research should explore the possible impact of alternative fiscal systems in 
a UK context in future research. (See, for example, McGregor and Swales (2005) and 
McGregor, Swales and Yin (2003).)  
 
The neglected system-wide effects of the Barnett formula are important in practice. Yet 
alternatives to Barnett are often framed essentially in terms of microeconomic “needs”.  If the 
macroeconomic consequences of Barnett really matter, as our analysis suggests, they should 
feature more heavily in decisions concerning the regional distribution of government 
expenditures.   
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Appendix  
 
A Condensed Version of the AMOS CGE Model 
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(13) Consumption Demand C C p p p Y cpii i i i
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i
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(14) Capital Stock Adjustment K d Ki i i  
(15) Investment Demand 
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(16) Government Demand 
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NOTATION 
 
Activity-Commodities 
i, j are activity/commodity subscripts. 
Transactors 
UK = United Kingdom, ROW = Rest of World 
Time Periods 
s = short run, l = full adjustment  
Nominal/Real 
Variables are generally expressed in real terms apart from where the superscript n is used. 
 
Functions 
p (.)  cost function 
uck(.)  user cost of capital formulation 
wn(.), wk(.) factor price setting functions 
C(.), I(.), X(.) Armington consumption, investment and export demand functions, 
  Homogenous of degree zero in prices and one in quantities 
KD(.), ND(.) factor demand functions 
L  zero net migration condition 
G  Barnett pulic sector expenditure formula  
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Variables 
C  consumption 
D  exogenous export demand 
G  government demand for local goods 
I  investment demand for local goods 
K  investment demand by activity 
KD, KS, K capital demand, capital supply and actual capital stock  
L  labour force 
ND, N  labour demand and total employment 
Q  commodity/activity output 
X  exports 
Y  household nominal income 
b  elements of capital matrix 
cpi, kpi  consumer and capital price indices 
d  physical depreciation 
p  price of commodity/activity output 
uck  user cost of capital 
wn, wk  wage, capital rental 
  share of factor income retained in region 
  consumption weights 
  capital weights 
 
Notes :  A number of simplifications are made in this condensed version of AMOS 
1. Intermediate demand is suppressed throughout (e.g. only primary factor demands are 
noted in price determination in equation (1) and final demands in the determination of 
commodity demand in equation (12).   
2. Income transfers are generally suppressed.   
3. Taxes are ignored. 
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4. The participation rate is ignored. 
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Table 1: The percentage change in Scottish real government expenditure across different Barnett 
equilibria. 
  
Capital 
Adjustment 
Wage Bargaining Population Adjustment 
Fixed  Full 
No updating 
Barnett weights 
Full updating 
Barnett weights 
Fixed  Regional                       C 
-10.65                   
                      D                         
-10.69 
 G 
-12.43 
National                      C 
-10.78 
                     E 
-10.72 
                    H 
-12.81 
Full Regional                     C 
-10.82 
                     F 
-11.26 
                    I 
-14.58 
National                     C 
-11.26 
 
Notes: The letter in the top right-hand corner of individual cells indicates the corresponding 
point on Figure 2. 
 
 
Table 2: The percentage change in Scottish GDP across different Barnett equilibria. 
  
Capital 
Adjustment 
Wage Bargaining Population Adjustment 
Fixed  Full 
No updating 
Barnett weights 
Full updating 
Barnett weights 
Fixed  Regional                       C 
-1.27                   
                      D                         
-1.75 
 G 
-2.04 
National                      C 
-1.99 
                     E 
-2.02 
                    H 
-2.41 
Full Regional                     C 
-1.33 
                     F 
-3.56 
                    I 
-4.61 
National                     C 
-3.30 
 
Notes: The letter in the top right-hand corner of individual cells indicates the corresponding 
point on Figure 2. 
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Table 3: The percentage change in Scottish employment across different Barnett equilibria. 
  
Capital 
Adjustment 
Wage Bargaining Population Adjustment 
Fixed  Full 
No updating 
Barnett weights 
Full updating 
Barnett weights 
Fixed  Regional                       C 
-1.46                   
                      D                         
-2.27 
 G 
-2.64 
National                      C 
-2.64 
                     E 
-2.70 
                    H 
-3.23 
Full Regional                     C 
-1.52 
                     F 
-3.88 
                    I 
-5.03 
National                     C 
-3.61 
 
Notes: The letter in the top right-hand corner of individual cells indicates the corresponding 
point on Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: The equilibrium population and government expenditure with 
Barnett equilibrium (variable weights) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Barnett equilibria DEL and population levels under various 
assumptions concerning labour and capital market flexibility  
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Figure 3: Sectorally disaggregated change in GDP with Barnett variable population weight equilibrium in the short-run, 
medium-run, and long-run: regional bargaining and endogenous population
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Figure 4: Sectorally disaggregated change in employment with Barnett variable population weight equilibrium in the short-run, 
medium-run, and long-run: regional bargaining and endogenous population
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